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Abstract
To raise awareness of the financial consequences for companies that do not safeguard
personal data, this thesis investigates the stock market reaction following hacks.
Furthermore, it investigates the role consumers and regulatory agencies play in inflicting
financial consequences on companies that are hacked. While previous studies have focused
on data breaches in general, this thesis focuses on hacks, because hacking is the most
dominant form of data breaches and is increasing in frequency. The thesis contributes
to existing literature by examining 42 of the world’s largest hacks announced between
2007 and 2020. The research questions are answered by using event study methodology as
described by MacKinlay (1997).
We find an average negative stock market reaction of 1.7% on the first trading day following
the announcement of the hacks. Moreover, we find that the stock prices do not fully
recover within the following ten days, indicating that shareholder value is at risk. When
investigating the role of consumers, we find that when many client’s records are exposed
in the hack, the stock market reaction is stronger. This may be because investors expect
that the consumers will use their market power to punish the companies that have been
hacked, and that this will decrease the net value of the company. More surprisingly, we
find no statistically significant impact when the data exposed in the hack is sensitive to
the customers. Finally, we explore the stock market reaction to hacks prior to and after
the implementation of the GDPR in 2018, with a subsample of 33 events. The GDPR
has raised the maximum fines for companies that are hacked, however, we do not find
evidence of stronger stock market reactions after it was put into effect in our data sample.
Our findings suggest that IT managers and top executives should be concerned with
protecting the personal data that the company stores, because there exists a trade-off
between investing in cyber security and carrying the costs of being hacked.
Keywords – Hack, Data breaches, Cyber security, Regulatory agencies, IT managers,
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1 Introduction
Cyber-attacks were identified as one of the top five global risks to economic growth by
The World Economic Forum in 2019 (The World Economic Forum, 2019). As the world is
getting more digitized the amount of personal data that is stored is increasing. At the
same time, organizations had a 29.6% chance of getting breached within two years in 2019.
This makes up an increase of 7% from 22,6% in 2014 (IBM Security, 2019). Hence, there
is a growing risk that private information is leaked and abused. What if someone had
access to all the emails you have ever written, or someone used your credit card? These
issues have already affected millions of people across the globe, and individuals carry one
part of the cost.
However, once the personal data is online, it is the organizations and companies that store
the data that have the power to protect it from being exposed and abused. The question
is whether companies are aware of the risk of getting hacked, and the expected financial
consequences of not safeguarding personal data. There is probably a trade-off between
investing in cyber security and paying the price of being hacked. The primary objective
of this thesis is to shed light on the financial consequences for companies that are hacked
to contribute decision relevant information about cyber security investments.
There are mainly two groups of corporate stakeholders that can inflict financial
consequences on companies that do not protect the personal data that they collect from
their customers. The first stakeholder is consumers who can vote with their wallets, and
with their personal data, for the companies that meet their requirements and expectations.
The second stakeholder is regulatory agencies that can pass laws which empowers the
authorities to impose sanctions on companies for not safeguarding personal data. This
way the external cost of a hack can be internalized by the companies. The secondary
objective of this thesis is to explore the role of these stakeholders in inflicting financial
consequences on companies that are hacked.
2 1.1 Background
1.1 Background
Data Breaches and Hacks
A data breach is when a company experiences an intentional or inadvertent exposure of
confidential information to unauthorized parties (Cheng, Liu, & Yao, 2017). Corbet and
Gurdgiev (2019) divide data breaches into four groups depending on the cause of the
data breach: (1) external data breach or hack, (2) employee release, (3) lost, stolen, or
discarded internal data devices and (4) unintentional disclosure. Hacking (1) has grown
substantially, while the other forms of cyber-attacks have remained constant (Corbet &
Gurdgiev, 2019).
Hacking is convenient for criminals as there is no geographic barrier and cheap to perform.
In addition, it is hard to identify the criminals behind the attack. Hence, it is expected
that the number of hacker attacks will continue to increase and that the hackers will
become more sophisticated in their methods (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014).
The Financial Consequences of Data Breaches
There are several possible ways data security breaches can impact the financials of a
company. The most apparent are the tangible costs. First, the loss of revenue, as companies
often must shut down their services to stop the attack from evolving. Second, employees
must spend time on the aftermath of the attack, which slows down the productivity of
the company. Third, there are direct costs related to repairing and replacing software and
hardware that have been damaged in the data breach. Fourth, fees, compensations and
fines related to legal prosecution from authorities and consumers that are affected by the
data breach is a potential cost (IBM, 2019; The AME group, 2020; Yayla & Hu, 2011).
The intangible costs are harder to measure but can be just as devastating to a company’s
financials as the tangible costs. For example, damaged brand reputation and loss of
customer trust and loyalty (Drinkwater, 2016). Customers may worry that the company
is not trustworthy after the loss of private information and can be hesitant to use their
products and services in the future. Bad reputation regarding data privacy can be hard
to restore and hence affect the company’s performance for years. This effect can be
further strengthened if customers switch to competitors, which will change the competitive
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landscape. Finally, there is a risk that investors are more hesitant to invest in the company,
which will increase cost of capital (IBM, 2019; The AME group, 2020; Yayla & Hu, 2011).
The tangible and intangible costs impact the stock price of a company through the
traditional financial valuation models, as explained in Appendix 1.
Data Protection Laws
As a reaction to the growing trend of cyber security events, there is an increasing regulatory
recognition of the threat security breaches impose. In 2018 the General Data Protection
Law (GDPR) was implemented in the European Union (EU). According to the EU (2020)
it is the toughest privacy and security law in the world. The GDPR enables authorities
to sanction companies that do not safeguard personal data of citizens in the EU. The
EU informs that the maximum penalty for companies and organizations is e20 million
or 4% of global revenue, whichever is higher. Data protection authorities can also issue
sanctions, such as bans on data processing or public reprimands, that can lead to indirect
cost such as damage of the brand or limitations of their operations (The European Union,
2020). Fines and sanctions will reduce the dividend payments for investors.
1.2 Research Question Development
In this thesis, we attempt to quantify the stock market reaction for companies that are
hacked, to make companies that store personal data aware of the potential financial
consequences of being hacked, and to facilitate adequate decisions about investments in
cyber security. Furthermore, we focus on hacks, as opposed to unintentional exposure
of data. This is because the risk of unintentional exposure of data can be mitigated
by implementing internal routines and physical barriers. However, protection against
hacking attacks demands more sophisticated and complex protective measures. In addition,
hacking is the most dominant form of data breaches and has grown substantially in the
2000’s (Corbet & Gurdgiev, 2019). This makes hacking highly relevant.
Most research papers on the topic focus on small and medium sized hacks and data
breaches and some find significant stock market reactions while others do not. In this
thesis we investigate the stock market reaction following the announcement of mega hacks,
due to limited data availability of smaller hacks. However, we believe this is relevant to
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decision-making on investments in proactive measures to avoid successful hacks. According
to IBM Securities (2019), the average size of a data breach was 25 575 records lost in
2019. In this thesis, the average number of records lost is 36.7 million. The data sample
consists of 42 large hacks from 2007 till 2020, where personal data was exposed.
Hypothesis 1:
H1: A firm-specific hack will influence the stock value negatively following the
announcement of the hack to the public.
Our secondary objective is to investigate the determinants of the stock market reaction,
to understand the role customers and regulatory agencies play in inflicting financial
consequences on companies that are hacked. The number of individual records lost is
used as a proxy to the number of customers that are affected by the hack. This is because
at the announcement of a hack the number that is reported as the number of records
lost is usually the same as the number of accounts or clients affected. The hypothesis is
that when many customers are affected, it is more likely that the company experience a
decrease in revenue because the customers chose to not buy the product or service again.
Thus, the tangible and intangible costs to the company increase, and the stock market
reaction is stronger. To measure the severity of the consequences to the customers who
are victims in the hack, we use the data sensitivity of the data extracted. It is reasonable
to think that when sensitive information is extracted, the potential damage it can do to
the victims is higher and that the customers will punish the company accordingly.
Hypothesis 2:
H1: A firm-specific hack will have a stronger negative impact on the stock value
following the announcement of the hack if it is expected to have great impact
on the customers of the firm. The impact on the customers is measured as the
number of records lost and the data sensitivity of the data exposed in the hack.
To explore the effect of regulation on the financial consequences to companies that
are hacked, the stock market reaction to hacks that occurred before the GDPR was
implemented is compared to hacks that happened after. The GDPR enables authorities to
sanction companies that do not safeguard personal data of citizens in the EU. The GDPR
builds on the 1995 Data Protection Law that is also meant to make businesses protect
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data. However, the fines were miniscule and had little deterrent effect according to the
EU commissioner Viviane Reding (2014). One will therefore expect that the companies
breached after the GDPR was put into effect will experience a stronger market reaction
than hacks before the GDPR. This because the potential sanctions increase the expected
costs to the companies that are hacked. This result is expected regardless of where the
company is registered as long as there are EU citizens in the customer base, because the
company is then subject to the law.
Hypothesis 3:
H1: A firm-specific hack will have a stronger negative impact on the stock value
following the announcement of the hack if the firm is subject to regulations
that empower authorities to sanction the specific firm for not safeguarding the
personal data.
The above hypotheses will be investigated using event study methodology and cross-
sectional analysis.
1.3 Structure
This thesis consists of ten sections. In the first section we have now introduced the topic
of hacks, defined the research question and presented some background information. The
second section accounts for existing literature and the contribution of this thesis. The
third section describes the market efficiency theory, followed by a thorough explanation
of the event study methodology in section four. In section five the selection criteria for
the sample are presented, followed by descriptive statistics of the final sample. Section
six investigates the research question and presents the results from the analysis. In the
seventh section the analysis is discussed and compared to the findings of similar research
papers. Finally, in section eight and nine robustness tests are conducted and the analysis
is assessed critically, before the thesis is concluded in section ten.
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2 Relevant Literature
In this section event studies and reports about the cost of data breaches are presented and
discussed. The literature regarding large data breaches and hacks is somewhat restricted
in amount. This is potentially because the number of publicly announced mega hacks is
limited. In addition, research is quickly outdated due to the rapid development on this
field. Lastly, we elaborate on the thesis’ contribution to existing literature.
2.1 Studies on the Cost of Data Breaches to Companies
IBM Security and the Ponemon Institute (2019) have published a report on the cost of
data breaches, that is based on interviews of 507 small and medium sized companies
subject to data breaches between July 2018 and April 2019. The report does not account
for mega breaches such as the breaches of Equifax and Facebook. According to IBM
Security and the Ponemon Institute, the last five years the average total cost of data
breaches has grown by 12% to $3.92 million per company. Additionally, the life cycle of
each data breach is longer than before, and the data breaches impact the organizations for
years. In the report it is stated that the health sector has the highest average industry cost
when breached of $6.45 million, which is likely due to their access to personal data. The
conclusion is that organizations need to account for the risk of data breaches. This report
offers valuable insight to the company perspective of data breaches, however one should
be aware that interviews as a research method can be subject to biases. Additionally, it is
uncertain if they are able to quantify the intangible costs, such as loss of revenue due to
reputational damage. Hence, the cost could be much greater.
Shaen Corbet and Constantin Gurdgiev (2019) study 819 cyber security events that
occurred between 2005 and 2015. Among these, 230 were severe hacks. They find that
severe hacks are punished by significantly reduced abnormal returns. They also find
that small data breaches are not punished at the stock exchange at all. Moreover, they
state that the stock market volatility is strongly positively correlated with the size of the
company and the number of records lost. Another relevant finding is that the frequency
of cyber security events has increased over time, especially for hacks.
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A study conducted by Yayla and Hu (2011) show that security breaches impact the
abnormal return of breached companies. The data sample consists of 130 companies
breached between 1994 and 2006. They also find that security events after 2001 had no
statistically significant impact on the stock exchange. They suggest that this is an effect of
investors being less sensitive to the announcement of a security event. Lastly, the analysis
shows that there is a long-term effect on the stock price. Hence, top executives and IT
managers should pay attention to cyber security.
Morse, Raval and Wingender Jr. (2011) studies the effect of data breaches on the behaviour
of the stock markets using event study methodology. Their sample consists of 306 publicly
traded companies that were breached between January 2000 and February 2010, and 34 of
the breaches were hacks. In general, they find a negative stock market reaction where the
effects are not temporary. The data sample is divided into three based on the key source
of the data breach: hacking, fraudulent access, and stolen laptop. They find that hacking
attacks do not draw any market effects. However, when analysing data breaches where a
stolen laptop or fraudulent access is the key source, they find a negative stock market
reaction. It is argued that hacking attacks are beyond the company’s control, hence, the
company management cannot be blamed for the data breach and the investors will not
punish them. However, we find this argument questionable as further discussed in section
7.
A study conducted by Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2003) use event study
methodology to examine the economic cost of publicly announced information security
breaches on publicly traded US corporations. The data sample consists of 43 events of
security breaches in the period between January 1995 and December 2000. A subsample
consisting of 11 events is used to investigate breaches with confidential information such
as credit card data. They find limited evidence of a negative market reaction following
the announcement of a breach. However, when announced that confidential information
is extracted, they find a statistically significant negative market reaction. In conclusion,
the findings suggest that investors value the affected firm’s differently depending on the
confidentiality of the information in the breach.
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There are several older research papers that investigate the stock market reaction following
the announcement of security breaches using event study methodology. Garg, Curtis
and Halper (2003) studies 22 companies between 1999 and 2002, Cavusoglu, Mishra and
Raghunathan (2004) use a sample of 66 observations from 1996 till 2001, and Kannan, Rees
and Sridhar (2007) study 72 companies breached before 2001. They all conclude that there
is a statistically significant negative stock market reaction following the announcement of
data breaches.
2.2 Our Contribution to Existing Literature
This thesis contributes to existing literature by focusing on mega hacks that other
researchers have avoided in their data sample, because these incidents are regarded as
outliers. By studying the worst-case scenario, we believe that we can contribute to decision
making in large corporations who run the risk of being hacked. Moreover, we offer a
new perspective to the investigation of the determinants of the stock market reaction
by exploring the role of consumers and regulatory institutions in inflicting financial
consequences on companies that are hacked. To our knowledge, the topic of regulation
has not yet been investigated using event study methodology and cross-sectional analysis.
Our data sample consists of recent hacks, which is a strength because of the rapid
development in this area. In addition, it allows us to investigate whether the stock market
reaction for hacks has changed after the GDPR was put into effect. The data sample also
includes companies from all over the world, whereas other studies focus on companies
from the US. In addition, the sample consists of hacking events, not data breaches in
general, to provide information about the trade-off between investing in cyber security
and the cost of being hacked.
Due to limited data availability and the time constraint, we had to make a trade-off
between collecting a large data sample and investing time in the analysis. The final data
sample consists of 42 events. The fact that our data sample contains 42 events, in contrast
to other research which have larger data samples, offers some limitations but also some
strengths. We have a clean data sample with carefully investigated event dates and little
influence from confounding events.
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3 Theory
This section accounts for the market efficiency hypothesis, which is a central assumption
in the event study methodology.
Market Efficiency
The market efficiency hypothesis, introduced by Fama (1970), is the hypothesis that
“security prices fully reflect all available information”, as opposed to the hypothesis that
security prices follows a random walk. Fama (1970) defines three strengths of market
efficiency that defines subsets of available information that are fully reflected in security
prices: weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. In the weak form efficiency the
security prices reflect the past stock prices. The semi-strong form includes the weak
form, as well as all obviously publicly available information is reflected in the stock price.
While in the strong form efficiency all information, both publicly available and inside
information, is reflected in the price.
According to Fama (1991) it is generally accepted that the market is roughly semi-strong.
If the market is semi-strong efficient it will quickly and fully reflect new information so
an investor cannot use this information to generate extraordinary returns. Under this
assumption, positive and financially relevant news about a company should lead to an
immediate increase in the company’s stock price. Consequently, information that suggests
that the company will perform worse than previously expected should lead to a decrease
in the company’s stock price. The traditional stock valuation models are explained more
extensively in Appendix 1.
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4 Empirical Methods
In this thesis the event study methodology and cross-sectional regression analysis are
implemented as described by MacKinlay (1997). Event studies are used to measure the
effect of an economic event on the value of firms. By subtracting the estimated normal
return from the actual return of the company following the announcement of a hack, we
can approximate the financial consequences of the event. Cross-sectional analysis is used
to investigate the link between the abnormal return and certain determinants of the stock
market reaction.
In this section the event study methodology is explained. Furthermore, models to estimate
normal performance are elaborated on. In the third part, the equations for the computation
and aggregation of abnormal return are derived. At last, the cross-sectional test and the
cross-sectional regression model are explained.
4.1 Event Study Methodology
There are four underlying assumptions to the event study methodology. The first is that
markets are efficient, as elaborated on in section 3. Second, one assumes that the players
in the market are rational. The third assumption is that the event is unanticipated,
meaning that there must be new and unexpected information revealed at the event date.
Fourth, there must be no confounding events, so that the impact on the stock market can
be contributed to the event (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
When conducting an event study, the initial task is to select the events to analyse based
on the objective of the study and the general selection criteria for event studies. Second,
the event date of interest must be defined, which is often challenging. For example, to
identify the event date one can investigate when newspapers first reported on the event.
However, a common challenge is to decide with certainty whether the event is known to
the market before it is reported in the news. Hence, to make it less probable to miss the
event, the event window is often expanded to permit examination of periods surrounding
the events (MacKinlay, 1997).
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After choosing the event window, the estimation window must be defined. The estimation
window will be used to calculate the normal performance of the stock before the event
(MacKinlay, 1997). There is no correct answer when choosing the length of the estimation
window. However, the interval should be long enough to minimize the variance of the
daily returns and short enough to include only the latest price movements, thus, avoiding
changes in systematic risk (Strong, 1992). Typically, the event window and estimation
window do not overlap to prevent the normal return model from being impacted by the
return in the event period (MacKinlay, 1997).











Figure 4.1 is a modification of the event study timeline presented by MacKinlay (1997). T0 marks the
starting point of the estimation window, while T1 marks the ending point. T2 marks the beginning of the
event window, while T3 marks the end. The period between T1 and T2 is the holdout window which is
added to ensure that the estimation window and event window do not overlap. The announcement day is
marked with “0”.
In this thesis, we use daily stock return. T0 is equal to -220 days, while T1 is -20 days.
Consequently, the estimation window is equal to 200 trading days. In addition, a holdout
window of nine days is chosen, which gives an event window of [-10, 10]. This implies 21
trading days between T2 and T3.
The next step of the event study is to estimate the expected return of the security during
the event window, conditioned on the event not taking place. Normal performance models
used to calculate normal return are discussed in subsection 4.2. Once the expected return
is calculated for the event window, the abnormal return is estimated by subtracting the
actual ex-post return of the security. Formally, the abnormal return is derived by equation
4.1.
ARiτ = Riτ + E(Riτ |Xτ ) (4.1)
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Where AR is the abnormal return for firm i on event date τ . While Riτ is the actual
return and E(Riτ |Xτ ) is the expected return for time period τ . The expected return is
calculated conditioned on the event not taking place, expressed by the Xτ component.
4.2 Estimating Normal Performance
Normal performance models can be loosely categorised as either statistical or economic.
Statistical models, such as the Market Model and the Constant Mean Return Model,
are based on statistical assumptions about the behaviour of asset returns. Economic
models, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), rely on economic assumptions concerning investors’ behaviour in addition to the
statistical assumptions. However, deviations from the CAPM have been discovered and
in the APT model, the most important factor behaves like the market factor. Thus, the
gains from using the economic models are relatively small when compared to the Market
Model. Consequently, in event studies statistical models dominate (MacKinlay, 1997).
Thus, only the statistical models are discussed in more detail below.
The Constant Mean Return Model
The Constant Mean Return Model assumes that the average return for a given security
is constant over time (MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, a constant return parameter and a
disturbance term is used to define the normal return. Although the Constant Mean
Return Model is a simple model, Brown and Warner (1980) find that it often yields similar
results as more sophisticated models. Formally, the Constant Mean Return Model is given
by equation 4.2.






Riτ E(εiτ = 0) var(εiτ ) = σ
2
ε i
In equation 4.2, the predicted normal performance for security i at time τ is represented
by Riτ . εiτ is the error term, with an expected value of zero and a variance of σ2ε i . The
average return of event i over the estimation period is expressed by µ̂i. Furthermore, the
estimation window is represented by L1.
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The Market Model
The Market Model is based on the assumptions that there is a stable linear relationship
between the return of a market portfolio and the security return. The model’s linear
specification follows from the assumed joint normality of asset returns (MacKinlay, 1997).
In equation 4.3 below, the Market Model is defined for any security i.
Riτ = αi + βiRmτ + εiτ (4.3)
E(εiτ = 0) var(εiτ ) = σ
2
ε i
From the equation, Riτ is the predicted normal return for security i at time τ , while Rmτ
is the return on the market portfolio at time τ . εiτ is the error term, with an expected
value of zero and a variance of σ2ε i . The parameters αi and βi are estimated by using OLS,
based on the observations in the estimation window. A broad-based stock index is used
for the market portfolio, such as the S&P500 Index, the CRSP Value Weighted Index or
the MSCI World Index.
The Market Model is often preferred over the Constant Mean Return Model (MacKinlay,
1997). The Market Model assumes a linear relation between the stock return and the
market return. Thus, by removing the portion of return that is tied to the market’s return,
the variation of the abnormal return is reduced. Consequently, the possibility of detecting
event effects increases (MacKinlay, 1997).
4.3 Computing and Aggregating Abnormal Return
The normal return models that are described above are used to calculate the abnormal
return of a security during the event window. The equations presented in this subsection
are based on the Market Model. However, the analysis using the Constant Mean Return
Model as the normal performance model is virtually identical (MacKinlay, 1997). The
equations are used to calculate the thesis results, which will be presented in section 6.
When the parameters αi and βi in the Market Model are estimated, the abnormal return
of the security during the event window can be predicted by the model, as expressed by
equation 4.4. The abnormal return is the disturbance term of the Market Model calculated
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on an out of sample basis (MacKinlay, 1997).
ARiτ = Riτ − (α̂i + β̂iRmτ ) (4.4)
MacKinlay (1997) states that under the null hypothesis (AR = 0), the abnormal return
will be jointly normally distributed conditional on the market returns of the event window
with a zero conditional mean and conditional variance σ2(ARiτ ) where:









From equation 4.5 we have the same notation as when explaining the Market Model in
subsection 4.2.2. The µ̂m expresses the estimated average return of the market in the
estimation window. When the estimation window, L1, becomes large, the second term in
equation 4.5 approaches zero, as the sampling error of the parameters αi and βi disappears
(MacKinlay, 1997). As a result, the variance will be σ̂2ε i .
In order to draw overall inference for the event of interest, the abnormal return observations
must be aggregated (MacKinlay, 1997). The aggregation can be conducted both through
time and across securities. Aggregating the abnormal return for a security across time,






The CAR from τ1 to τ2 is the sum of the abnormal return for security i (MacKinlay, 1997),
as expressed by the equation above.
Furthermore, the CAR for each security can be averaged to find the CAR for all securities
in the event pool (MacKinlay, 1997). The CAR is calculated by aggregating CAR for
all firms and divide by the number of events in the sample. For the aggregation it is
assumed that the event window of the N events does not overlap, and that there is not
any clustering (MacKinlay, 1997). Formally, the CAR can be derived by equation 4.7.














σ2i (τ1, τ2) (4.8)
4.4 Cross-sectional Test
In order to examine if hacking events influence the sampled company’s stock price, we use
a cross-sectional test to investigate whether the CAR is significantly different from zero.
This is a modified version of the Student’s t-test and a parametric test, hence the different
security’s CAR should be normally distributed (MacKinlay, 1997). The t-statistic is
calculated by dividing the CAR on its corresponding standard error. The cross-sectional






∼ N(0, 1) (4.9)
Because σ2ε is unknown an estimator must be used to calculate the variance of the
abnormal return. The estimator is the sample variance measure of σ̂2ε i from the Market
Model regression in the estimation window (MacKinlay, 1997). The distributional result
is asymptotic with respect to the length of the estimation window and the number of
securities. MacKinlay (1997) states that the ARs must be uncorrelated in the cross-section
for the estimator of variance to be consistent. For this to hold, there must not be any
clustering in the event window of the included securities. In equation 4.9, the variance of






(CAR(τ1, τ2)− CAR(τ1, τ2))2 (4.10)
16 4.5 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis
Due to issues with heteroscedasticity in the error terms, robust standard errors are
employed in the significance tests. When calculating each security’s variance individually
the standard errors are robust (MacKinlay, 1997).
4.5 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to examine the determinants of the stock market
reaction (MacKinlay, 1997). The model can be derived by the following equation.
CARj = δ0 + δ1x1j + ...+ δMxMj + ηj (4.11)
E(ηj = 0) var(ηj) = σ
2
ηj
From equation 4.11, CAR represents the cumulative abnormal return for the jth event
observation, while x1j indicates firm specific characteristics 1, for the jth event observation.
η
j
is the zero mean disturbance term, which is uncorrelated with the δ′s. Its expected
value is zero, and the variance is σ2ηj .
According to MacKinlay (1997) interpretation issues can arise when executing the
cross-sectional regression. The abnormal return will often be related to firm specific
characteristics through both the valuation effects of the event and anticipated effects due
to investors forecasting the likelihood of an event. Observed valuation effects may be
different form their true value in this case (MacKinlay, 1997).
For simplicity, CAR and AR 1 will be referred to as CAR and AR in the remainder of
the thesis.
1AR expresses the average abnormal return for all securities in the event pool.
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5 Data and Sample Description
The data sample studied in this thesis consists of 42 companies that were hacked between
2007 and 2020. The events are selected from a database based on the general selection
criteria for event studies. Information about the number of records lost and the data
sensitivity of the leaked information is provided in the database. The data is analysed in
R Studio (R Core Team, 2020).
The criteria for selection of the event study pool and the collection of financial data is
elaborated in this section. In the final part, we provide descriptive statistics of the data
sample.
5.1 Event Data Sample Selection
In this thesis the hacks studied are selected from a database that lists the World’s Biggest
Data Breaches & Hacks (McCandless & Evans, 2020). By using a database, the risk of
selection bias is mitigated. The database consists of 354 events of data breaches and
hacks that were announced between 2007 and 2020. It was downloaded the 22nd of
September 2020. There are three sources quoted for the database: (1) The Identity Theft
Resource Center, a US non-profit organization which supports victims of identity theft,
(2) DataBreaches.net, a website created by an anonymous individual with special interest
in data security, (3) and news articles. The database includes the name of the entity
that is hacked, the number of records lost, the year of the hack, the method used by the
hackers and the data sensitivity.
To answer the hypotheses of this thesis, the events where the method is described as
“Hacked” are selected to the event pool. Hence, all events where poor security, lost device
or inside job are listed as the reason for the data breach are filtered out (354 to 214 cases).
Events with apparent confounding events close to the event window are eliminated from the
event pool. According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) it is difficult to isolate the impact
of the studied event if other financially relevant events occurred during the event window.
Preferably, all events effecting the stock price that are not related to the announcement of
the hack should be excluded. However, to exclude price effects from confounding events
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manually is comprehensive and almost impossible. Large companies are often written
about in the media and consequently it is challenging to identify the news that classify as
confounding events. We excluded companies where we find apparent confounding events
within the event window, based on our subjective opinion.
The remaining events are screened based on the following criteria:
• The entity is publicly listed on a stock exchange.
• The company has not been acquired, merged, or delisted.
• The event is unanticipated.
When applying the selection criteria as laid out above, we are left with a dataset of 42
events. The complete data sample is provided in Appendix 2.
The Data Sample Used to Analyse the Effect of the GDPR
To analyse the stock market reaction before and after the implementation of the GDPR,
naturally the sample must be limited to the companies that are subject to the GDPR. The
GDPR applies to all companies that collect, store, transmit or analyse data of citizens in
the EU (The European Union, 2020). We investigated the customer base of each company
in the data sample and eliminated those that did not fit the criteria. Hence, the data
sample for the analysis of GDPR consists of 33 events.
5.2 Data Sources
Daily stock price information is downloaded from Yahoo Finance to calculate the abnormal
return of the companies in the event pool. To ensure the quality of the data, the closing
price reported at Yahoo Finance was compared to the prices listed on Bloomberg for a
selection of companies. We found that the prices were identical. The closing price is
adjusted for splits and dividend distributions. The formulas used to adjust the closing
prices vary from the different providers and Yahoo Finance uses the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) standards (Yahoo! Finance, 2020).
Additionally, the market value of equity is extracted from Bloomberg to calculate
the numerical changes in net value for the companies in the event pool following the
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announcement of a hack. Bloomberg reports yearly measures of equity and many of the
periods end and start the 31st of March, while for other companies it is stated for the
first day of the year. The equity values used in the thesis are from the same twelve-month
period as the hack was announced.2
In the application of the Market Model, the broad based MSCI World Index (Bloomberg,
2020) is used as the market portfolio. The MSCI World Index is a market capitalization
weighted index of 1603 companies across the world. It is chosen to reflect the wide variety
of companies in the sample, that are listed on different stock exchanges across the world,
such as the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchange in Japan, NASDAQ, the New York Stock
Exchange, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Australian Securities Exchange and the
London Stock Exchange.
The event dates are not reported in the database. Therefore, they were established by
investigating when the first articles about the specific hacks were published, or when the
companies first announced publicly that they had been hacked. It is crucial that the hack
was known for the stock market to react. In this thesis, the event date is the first trading
day that investors could possibly trade on information about the hack. For example, if the
hack was announced on Friday afternoon before easter, the event date is the first trading
day after easter on the stock exchange that the stock was listed. In effect, this thesis only
studies the influence of what is assumed to have been revealed in the first announcement.
As news reports do not always include all information, subjective judgement was applied.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
This subsection describes the sample, which includes the market value of equity of the
companies in the sample, the number of records lost, the data sensitivity and the timing
relative to the GDPR.
Table 5.1 shows the median, mean, minimum value and the maximum value of the
marked value of equity and the determinants in our analysis. Additionally, the number of
observations and grouping of the different determinants are included.
2Ideally, we would use the market value of the equity one week prior to the event, to avoid the effect
of the event in the valuation of the equity. However, this information was not available to us.
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Median 33 847 6 700 000 0.5 1 0
Mean 101 685 37 634 640 0.5 0.69 0.35
Min 237 1 025 0 0 0
Max 904 128 383 000 000 1 1 1
Standard deviation 179 823 68 394 505 0.5 0.47 0.48
Number of observations
Dummy variable: 0 21 13 22
Dummy variable: 1 21 29 11
Total 42 42 42 42 33
Note: Market value of equity is in million USD. Records lost (3), Data sensitivity (4) and
GDPR (5) are dummy variables. Records lost is divided based on the median value, while
data sensitivity is grouped based on the data extracted being of a sensitive character (1) or
not (0). Additionally, GDPR is divided into groups based on whether the company was hacked
before (0) or after (1) the GDPR was put into effect.
From the first column one can observe that the median of the market value of equity is
about one third of the mean. This implies that the distribution is skewed. Hence, there
are some companies with a high market valuation of equity which increases the average.
However, all companies in the sample are large in terms of market value of equity, as all
companies have equity above $237 million. This indicates that the sample consists of
well-established companies.
The second column shows the number of records lost. One can see that the number of
records lost vary from 1025 in the smallest hack (Wendy’s restaurant in 2016) to 383
million in the largest hack (Marriott International in 2018). The mean is 37.6 million
which is almost six times greater than the median that is 6.7 million. This indicates a
skewness in the distribution because some large observations increase the mean.
To investigate the impact of records lost on the stock market reaction, the data sample
is divided into two groups based on the number of records lost relative to the median.
The statistical properties of the dummy for records lost are presented in column three.
Naturally, there are 21 observations in each group. The dummy takes the value 1 if the
number of records lost is above 6.7 million, and 0 otherwise.
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The fourth column presents the statistical properties of the dummy variable for sensitivity
of the data extracted in the hack. Low data sensitivity is defined as online information
such as email addresses, information collected in loyalty programs, purchase history and
search history. This data is assumed to have little impact on the victim’s life when it
is extracted in a hack. There are 13 observations in this group. In contrast, high data
sensitivity is defined as personal information such as social security number, credit card
details and health records. We assume that the loss of such information is more likely to
cause negative consequences for the victims of the hack, such as financial loss or identity
theft. There are 29 observations in this group.
The last column in table 5.1 shows the dummy variable for timing relative to the GDPR.
There are 33 events that are relevant for investigating the impact of the GDPR on the
stock market reaction following the announcement of a hack. The 33 events are divided
into two groups depending on the timing of the hack relative to the implementation of
the GDPR the 25th of May 2018. The dummy takes the value 0 if the hack occurred prior
to the implementation of the GDPR. There are 22 events in this group. Also, there are 11
hacks that occurred after the implementation of the GDPR.
Our sample contains hacks in a period ranging from 1st of January 2007 until today. The
distribution of hacked companies is shown in figure 5.1.
22 5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5.1: Number of Hacks per Year





































Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the hacks in the data sample over time. The
distribution is uneven, and the number of hacks per year varies from zero to seven. Most
of the hacks in our data sample occurred after 2010 and the median year is 2014. The
distribution over time in our data sample reflects the general trend that the frequency of
hacks is increasing (IBM Security, 2019).
In the cross-sectional regression model, we include a dummy variable for time. The
statistical properties of the dummy are equal to those of the dummy variable “Records
lost” (3) in table 5.1, because the dummy is derived based on the median date.
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6 Analysis
The research questions presented in subsection 1.2 are investigated by using the event
study methodology. The AR and CAR3 are estimated using equations 4.4, 4.6 and
4.7. Different event windows are presented to investigate the longevity of the effects.
To reject the null hypotheses the CAR measured must be negative and statistically
significant. The hypothesis tests for the CAR are applied as described by MacKinlay
(1997). Furthermore, the t-statistic for the difference between CAR follows a Student’s
t-distribution. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are employed in the significance
tests, as the variance is calculated for each individual company.
In the tables presented in this section, the numbers in the squared brackets indicate the
days relative to the event date that have been summarized to calculate the CAR. The
significance levels of the statistical tests are indicated with stars. The y-axis of the graphs
presented in the analysis are adjusted to fit the data that is presented. Hence, the graphs
cannot be compared without taking the scale of the Y-axis into account.
The analysis consists of several parts. First, the CAR is analysed for the 42 events to
investigate the hypothesis regarding the stock market reaction following the announcement
of a hack. To highlight the practical relevance of the stock market reaction, the CAR
is translated into numerical values for each individual company. An illustration of the
development in CAR for the individual events is also presented. From the illustration, four
outliers are identified and discussed. Second, the events are split into groups depending
on the number of records lost and the sensitivity of the data extracted in the hacks. Then
the CAR for the two groups is compared to investigate the impact on the stock market
reaction. Third, a smaller sample is used to explore the effect of the implementation of
the GDPR on the stock market reaction. Finally, a cross-sectional regression analysis is
conducted to investigate the combination of the three determinants. The goal is to explore
the role consumers and regulatory agencies play in inflicting financial consequences on
companies that are hacked and consequently expose private client records.
3Average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return
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6.1 The Stock Market’s Reaction to Announcements of Hacks
Figure 6.1 illustrates the development of the CAR for the 42 events, from 10 days before
the event date till 10 days after. The CAR is calculated by using the Market Model
estimated in relation to the MCSI World Index. The figure shows that on the day of the
announcement, the CAR decreases.
Figure 6.1: CAR - Market Model
In the pre-event date window, the CAR fluctuates around zero. However, there is a
negative trend four days before the event date. In the post-event date window, the CAR
remains low for some days before it starts to recover. However, the figure does not show
full recovery within the first ten days after the event date.
Table 6.1 shows the results of the cross-sectional tests for the CAR in the event window
for the full sample of 42 events.
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Note: One-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
As expected, the AR is different from zero at a 1% significance level at the event day. The
table shows that on average the companies in the event pool experienced a negative AR
of 1.7% at the event day, which indicates that the market reacts instantaneously to the
news.
The most extreme stock market reaction is measured for the time interval of five days
prior to, and five days after the event day, where the CAR is negative 2.5%. In the post
event windows, the CAR is close to zero and not statistically significant, which indicates
that there is no recovery of the stock price. In summary, the average market reaction of
the hacks in the data sample is negative and instantaneous, with no statistically significant
recovery in the post-event day window.
6.2 The Cost of Being Hacked
To show the practical relevance of the negative stock market reaction, we estimate the
numerical change in market value of equity for the individual companies following the
announcement of the hack. The cost is calculated by multiplying CAR by the market
value of equity the same twelve-month period as the hack occurred. This gives an
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approximate valuation of the financial losses of the company following the hack. On
average, a time interval of two days seems to capture the stock market reaction most
adequately. However, to make more exact estimations, each event should be studied in
detail to define the most representative time interval. In the following table the cost is
calculated for all the events and sorted by the cost.
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Table 6.2: Approximations to the Cost of Being Hacked
Name Date of the hack Equity $M AR [0] AR [1] CAR [0, 1] Cost $M T-value P-value
Facebook 19.03.2018 512 793 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -40 511 3.27 4 %
Facebook 28.09.2018 561 779 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -20 224 0.93 22 %
Microsoft 15.04.2019 904 128 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -5 425 0.21 43 %
Apple 19.07.2013 360 225 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -5 403 0.42 36 %
Equifax 08.09.2017 16 545 -0.14 -0.09 -0.23 -3 756 11.63 0 %
Marriott International 30.11.2018 45 154 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -1 535 1.27 17 %
Cathay Pacific Airways 25.10.2018 43 823 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -1 534 0.84 24 %
Home Depot 03.09.2014 107 344 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -1 503 0.91 23 %
HSBC Turkey 12.11.2014 182 235 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -1 458 0.49 33 %
Zoom 02.04.2020 21 267 -0.11 0.05 -0.06 -1 276 0.94 22 %
Ebay 21.05.2014 69 989 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -1 260 0.69 28 %
Gmail (Oracle) 10.09.2014 184 310 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -922 0.25 41 %
Target 19.12.2013 40 824 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -816 1.12 19 %
TalkTalk 23.10.2015 4 545 -0.05 -0.12 -0.17 -786 5.87 1 %
Anthem 05.02.2015 33 693 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -741 0.91 23 %
Sony PSN 21.04.2011 51 045 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -715 0.45 35 %
Dell 29.11.2018 34 000 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -680 0.64 29 %
UPS 22.08.2014 93 831 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -657 0.50 33 %
Honda Canada 27.05.2011 67 997 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -612 0.35 38 %
Experian 02.10.2015 16 145 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -597 1.44 14 %
Sony Online Entertainment 27.05.2011 32 278 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -452 0.46 35 %
Tesco Clubcard 04.05.2020 28 557 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -343 0.41 36 %
T-Mobile 24.08.2018 50 622 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -304 0.21 43 %
Sega 20.06.2011 4 394 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -163 0.92 23 %
KT Corp. 30.07.2012 8 134 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -122 0.50 33 %
Nintendo 08.07.2013 13 721 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -55 0.09 47 %
Wendy’s 07.07.2016 2 528 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -35 0.43 36 %
Heartland 21.01.2009 335 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -31 1.10 19 %
VTech 27.11.2015 3 583 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -29 0.34 38 %
Global Payments 04.04.2012 4 055 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -20 0.14 45 %
UbiSoft 03.07.2013 1 038 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -7 0.13 45 %
Quest Diagnostics 12.12.2016 11 764 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0 0.00 50 %
Interpark 26.07.2016 237 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.09 53 %
Dominios Pizzas (France) 16.06.2014 1 263 0.00 0.02 0.01 16 0.33 62 %
Adobe 03.10.2013 22 958 -0.01 0.01 0.00 23 0.04 51 %
Dixons Carphone 13.06.2018 3 256 -0.03 0.04 0.01 46 0.33 61 %
TD Ameritrade 14.08.2007 11 922 0.01 -0.01 0.01 60 0.14 55 %
AT&T 09.06.2010 152 689 -0.01 0.01 0.00 611 0.22 58 %
Nintendo 09.06.2020 45 989 0.01 0.01 0.02 1 012 0.64 71 %
Toyota 29.05.2019 165 503 0.01 0.00 0.01 1 821 0.59 69 %
JP Morgan Chase 02.10.2014 225 188 0.00 0.02 0.02 4 279 1.03 80 %
Citigroup 09.06.2011 129 093 0.02 0.02 0.04 5 293 1.51 86 %
Mean 101 685 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -1 876
Median 33 847 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -397
Standard deviation 179 823 0.03 0.03 0.05 7 060
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. Two-tailed t-test.
Cost is calculated as equity multiplied by CAR.Equity and cost is in million US dollars. The events are sorted by cost.
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The CAR per company is statistically significant at a 5% significance level for Facebook
(March 2018), Equifax and TalkTalk. The median of the estimated cost over the two days
is $1 876 bn and the mean cost is $0.397 bn. There are large variations in the estimated
cost, as one can see from the standard deviation which is $7 060 bn.
The cost calculations show that a relatively small decrease in stock price might reflect
substantial numerical changes to the net value of the company. We find that there are
eleven companies in the data sample with an estimated cost above one billion dollars
related to the announcement of a successful hacker attack. This highlights the importance
of the topic of cyber security to companies that store personal information, and gives a
benchmark for the budget for cyber security investments.
Table 6.2 also shows that the CAR varies across the events. There are ten companies
which experienced a positive CAR around the event date. However, this is due to the
selected event date. By shifting the time interval of two days one day forward or backward,
we find negative CAR for all events in our event pool.
Some of the companies experienced a relatively large decrease in stock price at the day of
the announcement of the hack, and the following day. These observations seem to have
an unproportional influence on the results of the analysis. The extreme observations are
explored further in the following subsection.
6.3 Illustration of the Individual Event Studies
Figure 6.2 illustrates the development of CAR for each of the individual companies in
the event pool. From the figure one can see a tendency of negative AR at the event day,
when investigating each line separately. Also, most of the lines representing individual
companies are below zero around the event date, as expected. The illustration shows
that the results of our analysis may be somewhat driven by selected companies. These
companies are identified as Zoom (blue line with stars), Heartland (red line with circles),
Talktalk (dark green line with stars) and Equifax (purple line with dots). In the robustness
analysis in chapter 8, the analysis of the general stock market reaction is repeated without
the outliers.
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Figure 6.2: CAR - All Events in the Thesis
We provide a table with descriptive statistics of the outliers, so that the reader can be
aware of the influence these events have on the result in the further analyses.
Table 6.3: CAR Descriptive Statistics of the Outliers
Name Event date Subject to GDPR Number of Records Lost Data sensitivity CAR [-10, 10]
Heartland 21.01.2009 No 130 000 000 High -25.9 %
TalkTalk 23.10.2015 Yes 157 000 High -31.9 %
Equifax 08.09.2017 No 143 000 000 High -29.6 %
Zoom 02.04.2020 Yes 500 000 Low 15.5 %
From table 6.3 we find that Heartland, TalkTalk and Equifax have a negative CAR during
the event window at approximently 30%. Zoom on the other hand, has a positive CAR of
15% during the event window, even though the measured CAR at the event day is negative.
Moreover, Heartland and Equifax will be in the group of “high number of records lost”
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and “high data sensitivity”. However, these two companies are not subject to the GDPR
and will hence not be in the data sample when analysing the effect of the regulation. The
hack of Talktalk involved a relatively low number of records lost, but the data sensitivity
is regarded as high. Zoom has a low number of records lost and the data sensitivity in
the hack is low. Since Talktalk and Zoom have customers in the EU, these companies are
subject to the GDPR.
6.4 The Effect of the Amount of Records Lost
Figure 6.3 shows the development of CAR when the event pool is split into two groups
depending on the amount of records that are lost in the hack.
Figure 6.3: CAR - Number of Records Lost
Note: The number of records lost is high if more than 6.7 million records
were extracted, which is the median of the sample. In contrast, records
lost is considered low if less than 6.7 million records were extracted.
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From figure 6.3 one can observe that the group of events with relatively many records
lost, somewhat follows the expected pattern. At the event day there is a sharp decline in
AR. Moreover, prior to the event date, CAR fluctuates around zero and somewhat below.
After the event date, CAR continues to decrease, and does not recover within the ten first
trading days after the event date. The second group does not follow the expected pattern.
There is not a sharp decline in CAR on the event date, as the decrease starts four days
prior to the event. One can also observe that the CAR starts to recover the second day
after the event date, and almost recovers completely within ten days.
To further analyse the trends that one can observe in figure 6.3, we present significance
tests of CAR for different time intervals. In table 6.4 the group of events with a relatively
high number of records lost is compared to the group with a lower number of records lost.
In the third column the results of a two-tailed Student’s t-test of the difference between
the groups are presented.
Table 6.4: CAR for the Number of Records Lost
Timeline Records lost high Records lost low Difference
(1) (2) (3)
[0] -0.025*** -0.010** -0.014
(5.59) (2.34) (1.56)
[-1, 1] -0.029*** -0.015 -0.014
(3.27) (1.70) (0.87)
[-5, 5] -0.040** -0.010 -0.030
(2.78) (0.71) (1.18)
[-10, 10] -0.038* -0.002 -0.036
(1.88) (0.08) (1.19)
Post-Event Day Windows
[1, 5] -0.019* 0.008 -0.027
(1.79) (0.72) (1.67)
[1, 10] -0.007 0.016 -0.023
(0.37) (0.78) (1.28)
Observations: 21 21 42
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. T-statistic in parentheses.
Two-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.High number of records is defined as more than 6.7m.
Table 6.4 shows that the companies in the sample that lost a high amount of records in
the hack, experienced a statistically significant AR of negative 2.5% on average. When
expanding the event window symmetrically around the event day, the measured CAR
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increase. At the most extreme, the measured CAR is negative 4%. On the other hand, the
group of fewer records lost, only shows a significantly negative AR at the event date and
the decline is at negative 1% on average, and this result is significant at a 5% significance
level.
The most important finding in this analysis is that the difference between the groups
is close to significant for the measured AR on the event day and in the post event day
window. This indicates that there is a difference between the groups, and that the stock
market reaction following the announcement of a hack is impacted by the number of
records lost.
6.5 The Effect of Data Sensitivity
From the data sample, we have derived two groups based on the data sensitivity of the
hacks. Figure 6.4 illustrates the development of CAR for the hacks with sensitive data,
compared to the group with less sensitive data. At first sight, it seems that there is a
large difference between the two groups. However, when investigating the cross-sectional
tests and the Student’s t-tests in table 6.5, a different conclusion is drawn.
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Figure 6.4: CAR - Data of Low and High Sensitivity
Note: Low sensitivity: online information such as email addresses,
information collected in loyalty programs, purchase history and search
history. High sensitivity: personal information such as social security
number, credit card details and health records.
Figure 6.4 shows negative AR for the events in the sample of low and high sensitivity
at the event day. While the CAR for hacks of low sensitivity is positive across almost
the entire event window, one can see that it is mostly negative for the group with high
data sensitivity. The pattern of the group with low sensitivity is similar to the pattern of
Zoom from the graph in subsection 6.3, where the individual events are illustrated. Since
it seems that Zoom affects the results, a graph without Zoom is provided in Appendix
3. The CAR for the group with high sensitivity is mostly decreasing during the event
window, with a steep decrease at the event date. Additionally, one can observe that the
CAR for sensitive data does not recover from the effect of the hack during the ten days
after the event date.
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In table 6.5 the results of the hypothesis tests are presented. The third column shows the
results from a two tailed t-test of the difference between the CAR for hacks with high and
low data sensitivity.
Table 6.5: CAR for Data Sensitivity
Timeline Low data sensitivity High data sensitivity Difference
(1) (2) (3)
[0] -0.018*** -0.017** 0.000
(4.76) (3.04) (0.03)
[-1, 1] -0.018** -0.024** 0.005
(2.44) (2.06) (0.36)
[-5, 5] -0.017 -0.029 0.012
(1.37) (1.54) (0.56)
[-10, 10] 0.011 -0.033 0.044
(0.63) (1.28) (1.59)
Post-Event Day Windows
[1, 5] -0.002 -0.007 0.005
(0.09) (0.44) (0.35)
[1, 10] 0.014 0.000 0.014
(1.12) (0.00) (0.72)
Observations: 13 29 42
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. T-statistic in parentheses.
Two-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
From table 6.5 one can see that the difference in CAR between the two groups is not
statistically significant for any time interval. This indicates that there is no difference in
stock market reaction at the event date depending on the sensitivity of the data in the
hack.
The AR for data extracted with high sensitivity is statistically significant at the event
day, and when expanding the interval with two days. The same result is measured for
the group with low data sensitivity. When examining the five days after the day of the
event, both sensitive and less sensitive data have negative CAR. These results are not
significant, indicating that the abnormal return is zero. Hence, there is no recovery. The
difference between the two groups is close to significant for the entire event window of 21
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days. However, this is probably due to events in the pre-event window, which do not tell
us anything about the reaction to the announcement of hacks.
In summary, there is no statistically significant differences between the groups in the time
intervals close to the event date. Hence, the first impression from looking at the graph is
misleading, and we find no support for the hypothesis that the sensitivity of the data in
the hack has an impact on the stock market reaction.
6.6 The Effect of the GDPR
Figure 6.5 shows the difference in CAR for companies hacked prior to and after the GDPR
was put into effect. Note that the sample contains the 33 events that are subject to the
GDPR. At first sight, it seems that there is a large difference between the two groups.
However, when investigating the hypothesis test in table 6.6 around the event date, there
are no significant differences.
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Figure 6.5: CAR - Before and After the Implementation of the GDPR
Note: The 33 events that are subject to sanctions are divided depending
on the hack happing before or after the GDPR was put into effect the
25th of May 2018.
From figure 6.5 one can observe that the decline in AR on the event day differs between
the groups. For the companies which announced that they had been hacked after the
GDPR was put into effect the decline is relatively stronger. Nevertheless, one can observe
that the CAR for these companies recovers shortly after the event date. Also, note that
Zoom, which is identified as an outlier, is in this group. Zoom had a strongly positive
CAR prior to the event, which can explain some of the volatility prior to the event date.
A graph without Zoom is provided in Appendix 3. The companies that were hacked
before the introduction of GDPR, experienced a gradually decreasing CAR over the event
window. The outlier TalkTalk is in this group.
6.6 The Effect of the GDPR 37
Table 6.6 shows how CAR differs for hacks that happened before and after the GDPR
was put into effect for different time intervals. The third column in the table shows the
difference in the CAR between the two groups, and the results from the t-tests.
Table 6.6: CAR for Time Relative to the Implementation of GDPR
Timeline Before GDPR After GDPR Difference
(1) (2) (3)
[0] -0.010** -0.021*** 0.011
(2.43) (3.34) (0.86)
[-1, 1] -0.013 -0.021 0.007
(1.58) (1.62) (0.07)
[-5, 5] -0.015 -0.018 0.004
(1.04) (0.87) (0.60)
[-10, 10] -0.031 0.031 -0.063**
(1.61) (1.08) (2.56)
Post-Event Day Windows
[1, 5] 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.22) (0.00) (0.19)
[1, 10] -0.002 0.029 -0.031*
(0.08) (2.07) (1.85)
Observations: 22 11 33
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. T-statistic in parentheses.
Two-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. GDPR was implemented the 25th of May 2018.
The table shows that the difference between the stock market reaction for the two groups
is not statistically significant in the time intervals close to the event date. For the group
with hacks that ocurred after the GDPR was implemented, we find a significant average
decrease of 2.1% in AR. Similarly, AR is significantly negative for the companies hacked
before GDPR with a decrease of 1% at the event day. Furthermore, when expanding the
event window the CAR is still negative, but not statistically significant.
There are two time intervals where the difference between the two groups is statistically
significant. The first is when investigating the entire event window of 21 days. However,
this can probably be attributed to the abnormal return prior to the event for volatile
companies such as Zoom, which is in the group of companies that were hacked after the
GDPR was implemented. The second time interval with statistically significant differences
between the two groups is the ten days after the event date.
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In summary, figure 6.5 gives the impression that there are large differences between the
groups. However, when studying table 6.6, one can see that for the time intervals close
to the event date and at the event date, there is no statistically significant differences.
Hence, we find no support for the hypothesis that GDPR has impacted the stock market
reaction.
6.7 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Hack Announcements
As a final stage of our analysis, we provide a cross-sectional regression analysis of hack
announcements, with AR and CAR as the dependent variable and number of records lost,
data sensitivity and time as the explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are
coded as dummy variables and the dummy for GDPR is replaced by a time dummy. This
is because we suspect that the analysis of GDPR captures the effect of time, not the effect
of a new regulation. This hypothesis is discussed in section 7. Thus, to create the dummy
variable for time, the data sample is divided into two groups with 21 events in each group.
Since October 2014 is the median date of the data sample, the time dummy takes the
value 0 if the hack occurred before October 2014 and 1 otherwise.
The assumptions for OLS are investigated using plots and formal tests. The residual
errors are not normally distributed, which impacts the t-statistics. However, this is due
to the outliers in the data sample. When Heartland, Zoom, TalkTalk and Equifax are
excluded, the OLS assumptions hold. The cross-sectional regression analysis without
outliers is presented in the robustness analysis in subsection 8.3.
In table 6.7 the results of the regression analysis is presented using the Stargazer package
(Hlavac, 2018).
6.7 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Hack Announcements 39
Table 6.7: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Hack Announcements
CAR
[0] [0, 2] [0, 5] [0, 10]
Number of Records Lost -0.016∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.044∗ -0.043
(1.69) (2.64) (1.89) (1.62)
Data Sensitivity 0.006 0.014 0.011 -0.004
(0.62) (0.94) (0.42) (0.12)
Time -0.016∗ -0.025∗ -0.036 -0.025
(1.81) (1.90) (1.61) (0.98)
Intercept -0.005 0.002 0.010 0.025
(0.57) (0.14) (0.43) (0.92)
Observations 42 42 42 42
Degrees of Freedom 38 38 38 38
R2 0.137 0.214 0.137 0.093
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.152 0.069 0.022
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-stat in parenthesis. The numbers
in the brackets indicate the number of days beyond the event date. All
explanatory variables are dummies. Number of records lost: 0 when the
number of records lost is below the median, 1 otherwise. Data Sensitivity:
0 if the data sensitivity is low, 1 otherwise. Time: 0 if the hack occurred
before October 2014, 1 otherwise.
The variables in the regression analysis account for some of the variation in CAR. Moreover,
the results are consistent with the results in the analysis from subsection 6.1-6.6. The
number of records lost have a statistically significant effect on the CAR of the companies
that are hacked, but the effect is not significant when expanding the time interval to
including day six till ten. Furthermore, data sensitivity does not show a statistically
significant effect on CAR.
There is new insight from the time variable in the analysis, as it has a statistically
significant effect on the CAR. This result indicates that time may be the effect that is
captured in the analysis of the GDPR. However, the time effect diminishes over the longer
time intervals. It shows that for our data sample, hacks announced after October 2014
have a significant impact on the negative stock market reaction.
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6.8 Summary of the Analysis
To summarize the results from the analysis we provide a table with the three hypothesis
of the thesis and some concluding remarks. We show the results for two time intervals and
our conclusions based on the results from the analysis. "Supported" meaning statistically
significant negative CAR. "Weakly supported" meaning indications of difference between
the groups that are tested, but no significant finding. "Not supported" meaning no
indication of differences. In addition, we provide a short comment for each hypothesis.
Table 6.8: Summary of the Results in the Analysis
Hypotheses Event Windows Comments
[0, 5] [0,10]
H1: A firm-specific hack will influence the stock
value negatively upon the announcement
of the hack to the public.
Supported Supported
The CAR is significantly negative and
only partly recovers over the post
event window.
H2: A firm-specific hack will have a stronger
negative impact on the stock value at the
announcement of the hack if it is expected to
have great impact on the customers of the firm.
The influence of the customers is measured as:
H2a: The number of records lost Supported Weakly supported
When considering the cross-sectional
regression analysis we find support for the
hypothesis. In the robustness analysis we
find support for the hypothesis in the time
interval of 11 days.
H2b: the data sensitivity of the hack Not supported Not supported
We find no statisticaly significant
difference between hacks with high
and low data sensitivity
H3: A firm-specific hack will have a stronger
negative impact on the stock value at the
announcement of the hack if the firm is subject
to regulations that empower authorities to sanction
the specific firm for not safeguarding the personal data.
Not supported Not supported
The group with hacks that were announced
after GDPR, recovers significantly slower
than hacks before GDPR was implemented.
Hence, the hypothesis is not supported as the
effect is opposite of what was expected.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis we




In this section we discuss the findings in the analysis and compare the results to previous
research on the topic. First, we discuss the CAR following the announcement of hacks.
Second, we explore the hypothesis that the consequences to the customers impact the
stock market reaction. Finally, we discuss the hypothesis regarding the implementation of
regulations.
7.1 The Stock Market Reaction Following Hacking
Announcements
We find support for the hypothesis that there is a negative stock market reaction following
the announcement of a hack. In general, the negative stock market reaction that is
measured in this thesis can be explained by the expectation of increased future costs and
revenue losses when a company has been hacked. Under the assumption that markets are
efficient, investors price the expected future tangible and intangible costs into the stock
price instantaneously.
Our result is consistent with previous research on cyber security breaches in general, as
described in the literature review. When considering cyber security breaches in the form
of hacking, research is inconclusive. Morse et. al. (2011) study 34 hacks that occurred
between 2000 and 2010 and find that hacking, as opposed to other types of breaches, do
not draw any market effects. They argue that this is because attacks by hackers can be
perceived as out of the company’s control. Any company can be hacked independent of
the data security measures in place. However, one can argue that the fault of the company
is not relevant for the net value of the company. There are still tangible and intangible
costs related to the hack that impact the net value of the company, which in turn decrease
the dividend payout and the stock price.
On the other hand, the findings of Corbet and Gurdgiev (2019) is consistent with our
result. For companies exposed to cybercrime in the form of hacking, they find significantly
large volatility effects. It is argued that the financial markets are becoming more aware of
the consequences for companies of hacking attacks and are hence punishing the companies
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that have been breached accordingly.
The market value of equity is expected to be somewhat volatile, thus there must be a
long-lasting effect for management to be influenced by the stock price. Hence, the stock
market reaction the days following the announcement must be further investigated to
provide decision relevant information to IT managers and top executives (Yayla & Hu,
2011).
7.2 The Longevity of the Negative Stock Market Reaction
Our analysis shows that the stock does not recover the first five days after the announcement
of a hack. However, from day five till ten after the announcement, there is some recovery of
the stock prices on average. Nevertheless, the recovery is not statistically significant, which
indicates that the stock market reaction is not transitory. The findings are consistent
with the research of Corbet and Gurdgiev (2019) who study a prolonged event window
including 30 days after the announcement of the hacks. Their result show that the stock
price starts to recover 20 days after the event date, but that it is not fully recovered at
day 30.
According to the market efficiency theory, for the abnormal return to be positive, there
should be new financially relevant information that increases the net value of the company.
New information may be related to the hack, such as information that the attack has
been stopped. However, signs of recovery could also be related to confounding events.
This makes it hard to tell whether the recovery implies that the effect of the hack on the
stock price is short-term or long-term. Since the recovery measured in our data sample
is not statistically significant, there are strong indications that the effect of the hack is
long-term. In conclusion, our findings point towards that the shareholder value is at stake.
Thus, it suggests that IT managers and top executives should pay attention to preventing
hacking attacks.
7.3 The Customers Role in Affecting the Stock Market Reaction
We find some support for the second hypothesis that investigates the stock market reaction
in relation to the consequences for the customers that are affected by the hack. The
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cross-sectional regression analysis shows that the number of records lost has statistically
significant negative impact on the stock market reaction. In terms of data sensitivity,
there are no indications of differences between the groups.
A possible reason why the stock market reaction is stronger when many records are lost
is that more people are affected by the hack, thus the reputational damage is possibly
greater. Also, there are more victims who can take legal action, which is likely to cause
increased legal costs. The result is in line with the findings of Corbet and Gurdgiev (2019)
who states that the volatility in the stock market is highly positively correlated with the
number of client’s records stolen during a hack and the size of the company. Naturally,
the number of records lost, and the size of the company are positively correlated, hence
part of the effect that we observe can possibly be attributed to the size of the company.
For data sensitivity, we hypothesised that the loss of data of high sensitivity led to
relatively higher costs to the company because of the severe consequences for the customers.
Examples of such costs are legal fees, more forensic investigations, damage of the brand,
and following higher investments in improved cyber security. Our results do not support
this hypothesis: we find that the groups draw equal market effects. However, our result is
not consistent with previous literature. According to Campbell et al. (2003) investors
have a significantly negative reaction to security breaches when confidential information
is extracted. IBM Security (2019) investigated the differences in cost related to data
breaches for different sectors and found that the health sector, which holds highly sensitive
information, had higher costs than other sectors. To our knowledge, there is no previous
research on data sensitivity and security breaches in the form of hacks.
The deviation from previous research might be related to two different aspects of our
research. First, we have a small data sample which makes it more difficult to find
statistical significance. Second, our definition of high and low sensitivity of data: Online
information is defined as low sensitivity, however online data can be sensitive, such as
contact information. It is also possible that the damage caused by the breach is not
related to the sensitivity of the information. Data that is of low sensitivity can be abused
to achieve great damage. For instance, email addresses and passwords can be used to
access more sensitive information, since many people use the same email addresses and
password for several accounts.
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The number of records lost, and the sensitivity of the data could be related, which also
might offer some explanation for our findings. Companies that store many records about
customers often collects information of low sensitivity, such as e-mail. While companies
that collect data of high sensitivity often hold fewer records, such as health institutions.
This argument points toward that the number of records lost is a stronger driver of stock
market reaction than the sensitivity of the data in this sample.
In summary, the management of corporations that store personal data seems to have
converging interests with their customers. When the company stores many records, our
results point towards larger and more prolonged damage of the company which is reflected
in the stock price. In conclusion, IT managers and top executives should invest more in
cyber security if they store large amounts of customer data.
7.4 The Stock Market Reaction in Relation to the
Implementation of the GDPR
We hypothesised that the companies that were hacked after the GDPR was put into
effect would experience a stronger market reaction than hacks before the GDPR. This
because the potential sanctions increase the expected costs to the companies that are
hacked. The maximum fine is e20 million or 4% of global revenue, whichever is higher.
Our analysis is inconclusive on the effect the GDPR has on our event pool, probably due
to the sample size. There are only 11 companies in the data sample that were announced
hacked after the 25th of Mai 2018, when the law was implemented. This increases the risk
of conducting a type 2 error.
The market reaction on the day of the event is stronger after the GDPR was implemented,
but the effect is not significantly different from the other group. Even so, the result points
towards stronger market reactions after the GDPR. This may be explained by investors
pricing the potential fine into the valuation of the hacked company immediately.
In terms of recovery there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups,
however the effect is opposite of what was expected. For companies that were hacked
after the GDPR was implemented, the stock price is fully recovered after ten days. The
companies that were hacked before the implementation of the GDPR does not recover
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within ten days and the difference is significant at a 10% significance level. However, it is
possible that the determinant that is measured is not the implementation of the GDPR,
but other factors such as time.
To further investigate if the observed effect is time, a time dummy is included in the
cross-sectional regression analysis. We find that more recent hacks draw a stronger
market reactions than earlier hacks. The recent study of Corbet and Gurdgiev (2019) of
the development of stock market reactions over time is consistent with our findings. A
potential explanation of the development is that more information is stored online than
before, and thus, more damage can be done when a company is hacked. Also, one might
speculate that criminal hackers have become more talented and sophisticated and thus
are able to extract more information than before. Another possible explanation is that
consumers have become more aware of the potential consequences to hacks and cyber
security breaches in general, and thus use their market power to punish companies that
are hacked.
On the other hand, Yayla and Hu (2011) studied hacks between 1994 and 2006 and find
that there is no negative stock market reaction in more recent years. This indicates that
the stock market reaction has been diminishing over time, which is the opposite of what
we find. They provide two possible explanations for their observation. First, leakages
of information about the hack before the public announcement. The use of Internet is
increasing, which facilitates leakage. When there are leakages of information the stock
market reaction is spread over several days, and it is harder to measure the effect due
to confounding events. We recognize this as a potential issue for some of the events in
our data sample. For example, the hack of Zoom was first discovered when personal data
from hacks were posted for sale on the dark web. Other hacks were carried out years
before the company publicly admitted that they had been hacked. Thus, there is a risk of
leakages. Second, Yayla and Hu (2011) suggest that investors have become less sensitive
to the announcement of security events because there are more frequently news stories
about security breaches today than before.
In conclusion, there are reasonable explanations for both increasing and a decreasing
stock market reaction over time. When investigating the data sample based on the timing
relative to the GDPR, our findings are consistent with those of Yayla and Hu (2011).
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However, when investigating time in general, our findings are in line with those of Corbet
and Gurgiev (2019). Due to our small sample size, it is not possible to conclude. There
are no previous studies on the effect of GDPR that we are aware of, presumably because
it was recently put into effect.
7.5 Summary of the Discussion
In summary, our findings regarding the negative stock market reaction are consistent with
previous research. This indicates that IT managers and top executives have incentives to
invest in cyber security to prevent successful hacking attacks in general. Furthermore,
the number of records lost seem to impact the stock market reaction. However, we do
not find any evidence of impact from the data sensitivity. This is not consistent with
previous literature and can potentially be explained by our definitions of low and high
data sensitivity. Thus, the conclusion of the second hypothesis is that the incentives of
managers to protect personal data is somewhat intertwined with the interest of their
customers. Finally, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the GDPR has had an
impact on the stock market reaction following the announcement of a hack. However, this
is probably due to the small sample and that there are other determinants of the hack. In
the cross-sectional regression analysis, we investigate the effect of time in general and find
that there is an increase in negative stock market reaction in our data sample. The result
regarding time is consistent with previous research.
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8 Robustness Analysis
In this section we test the impact of some of the research design choices that are made, to
show how these choices influence the result. First, we test the impact of the outliers on our
main hypothesis. Second, we test the impact of the choice of normal performance model
and investigate the differences in estimated abnormal return between the Market Model
and the Constant Mean Return Model. At last, the cross-sectional regression analysis is
provided without outliers.
8.1 Omitting Outliers
The analysis of the main hypothesis is revisited because there are four outliers that might
influence the result unproportionally. The outliers identified in subsection 6.3 are the
hacks of Equifax, Zoom, Talktalk and Heartland. In figure 8.1 the development of the
CAR for the Market Model with and without the outliers are illustrated.
Figure 8.1: CAR - Market Model with and without Outliers
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The illustration shows that the outliers impact the AR at the event day. For the group
with outliers there is a steeper decrease in the stock price on average when compared to
the group without outliers. In terms of recovery, the group without outliers shows signs of
strong recovery already four days after the announcement, and the negative stock market
reaction is fully recovered at day eight.
Statistical tests of AR and CAR for different time intervals are provided in the table below
to give further insight into the impact of the outliers. The CAR for the time interval
of one till ten days after the event date is 1.1%, which is equal to the AR at the event
date. However, the recovery is not statistically significant. Hence, there are indications
that the negative market reaction is more transitory, but this cannot be confirmed by the
statistical tests.
Table 8.1: CAR with and without Outliers
Timeline With outliers Without outliers Difference
(1) (2) (3)
[0] -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.007
(5.60) (3.77) (1.30)
[-1, 1] -0.022*** -0.008* -0.014*
(3.51) (1.64) (1.64)
[-5, 5] -0.025** -0.006 -0.020*
(2.46) (0.61) (1.36)
[-10, 10] -0.020 -0.003 -0.017
(1.45) (0.22) (0.93)
Post-Event Day Windows
[1, 5] -0.006 0.002 -0.008
(0.77) (0.25) (0.77)
[1, 10] 0.004 0.011 -0.007
(0.41) (1.24) (0.60)
Observations: 42 38
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. T-statistic in parentheses.
One-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
The results presented in table 8.1 show that the four companies with the largest stock
market reaction influence the results. However, the overall conclusion does not change:
There is a negative stock market reaction on average at the day of the announcement, and
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that there is limited recovery. As expected, the stock market reaction is weaker without
the outliers.
New insight from the analysis of the outliers is that the effect seems more transitory, as
there is stronger stock price recovery within the first ten days. However, the recovery is
not statistically significant.
8.2 Alternative Normal Performance Models
The abnormal return is calculated using normal performance models. In this thesis we use
the Market Model because of its favourable qualities and because it is the most common
model for conducting event studies (MacKinlay, 1997). However, the choice of normal
performance models influences the results. Thus, we provide a comparison of the Market
Model and the Constant Mean Return Model estimation of CAR below. The Constant
Mean Return Model and the Market Model are estimated as described in equations 4.2-4.4.
Figure 8.2: CAR - Normal Performance Models
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From figure 8.2 one can observe that there are small differences in the estimation of CAR
for the two models. To further explore the size of the differences, we provide a table with
hypothesis tests below.
Table 8.2: CAR for Normal Performance Models
Timeline Market Model Constant Mean Return Difference
(1) (2) (3)
[0] -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.001
(5.60) (5.59) (0.08)
[-1, 1] -0.022** -0.019** -0.003
(3.51) (3.07) (0.30)
[-5, 5] -0.025** -0.024** -0.001
(2.46) (2.40) (0.07)
[-10, 10] -0.020 -0.024* 0.004
(1.45) (1.82) (0.20)
Post-Event Day Windows
[1, 5] -0.006 -0.005 -0.001
(0.79) (0.60) (0.11)
[1, 10] 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.31) (0.22) (0.09)
Observations: 42 42 42
Note: Numbers in the brackets represent days relative to the event day. T-statistic in parentheses.
Two-tailed t-test. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 8.2 shows that the models provide similar results. The difference between the
models is tested using a two-tailed studentized t-test. From column 3, we can see that
there are no statistically significant differences between the estimated abnormal return
for any time intervals. In addition, the most prominent differences are for the entire
event window, where the numerical difference is 0.4%, and for the event day where the
numerical difference is 0.1%. In conclusion, the results are independent of the choice of
normal performance model.
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8.3 The Cross-Sectional Regression without Outliers
As previously mentioned, the residual errors are not normally distributed in the
cross-sectional regression analysis. This affects the t-statistics. When excluding the
outliers from the data sample used in the regression, the OLS assumptions hold. The
analysis without outliers is provided below.
Table 8.3: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Hack Announcements without Outliers
CAR
[0] [0, 2] [0, 5] [0, 10]
Number of Records Lost -0.016∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.033∗
(3.11) (3.44) (2.27) (1.80)
Data Sensitivity 0.003 0.014 0.016 0.018
(0.62) (1.49) (1.14) (0.90)
Time -0.005 -0.014 -0.017 -0.010
(0.95) (1.68) (1.32) (0.53)
Intercept -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.012
(0.52) (0.33) (0.26) (0.67)
Observations 38 38 38 38
Degrees of Freedom 34 34 34 34
R2 0.241 0.311 0.177 0.100
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.250 0.104 0.021
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
T-stat in parenthesis.
From table 8.3, one can observe that the time variable is not statistically significant when
the outliers are excluded. However, for number of records lost, the statistical significance
is higher. This further strengthens the conclusion that we find support of the hypothesis
that the number of records lost has an impact on the stock market reaction. However,
our conclusion regarding time is dependent on including the outliers.
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9 Critical Assessment
In this section we assess the data sample critically by discussing the sample size and the
uncertainty regarding the event date. Furthermore, the limitations of the event study
methodology are outlined by discussing the assumptions for the methodology and our
choice of research design.
9.1 Limitations of the sample
Sample size
As a result of limited data availability and the strict selection criteria for event studies,
we have a small sample. With 42 observations we were able to investigate each hack to
understand its context. Also, we were able invest time in finding the exact time and date
for the public announcement of the hack to identify the first trading opportunity after the
announcement. However, the size of the data sample imposes some limitations on our
thesis.
Skewness is often higher for small samples because outliers could have a larger impact on
the results (Wooldridge, 2013). To control for the impact of outliers, the main analysis
was repeated in section 8, without the four observations that draw the strongest market
effects.
When using small samples there is also an increased risk of not rejecting a false null
hypothesis (type 2 error). Our data sample consists of 42 observations and for the analysis
of the impact of GDPR the data sample contains 33 observations. In addition, when
analysing the determinants, the observations are split into two groups, resulting in even
smaller samples. Consequently, the statistical power of the analysis is reduced and there
is a risk of type 2 errors.
Uncertainty of Event Date
The event dates are established by examining when the first articles regarding the hacks
were published. However, this way of identifying the event day may not capture the correct
date, as the market may have been aware of the event before the article was published.
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Thus, there is uncertainty tied to the speed of information to market participants and
leakages of information prior to official announcements. Additionally, the information
about a hack is likely to be announced in stages, as the severity of the hack often is not
known the day the hack is discovered. To account for the possibility of imprecise dates of
the announcement of hacks, the event window contains ten days before and ten days after
the event date. This permits us to analyse the CAR of different time intervals within the
event window.
9.2 Inherent Limitations of the Methodology
The Assumptions Behind the Method
Critics of the event study methodology will stress that there are several general limitations
and weaknesses of the methodology. This is because it builds on assumptions that are
disputed. For instance, the market efficiency hypothesis is widely researched, but the
financial literature has not reached consensus on whether it holds. Also, the assumption
that players in the market are rational does not necessarily hold. In addition, Kothari
and Warner (2004), argue that predictions of normal return based on expected return
models such as the Constant Mean Return Model and the Market Model are imprecise.
Finally, the assumptions behind the statistical hypothesis tests that are conducted to
conclude on whether the CAR is different from zero does not necessarily hold, especially
not for small samples. According to Brown and Warner (1985), the cross-sectional test is
prone to event-induced volatility, which lowers the statistical power. However, despite the
limitations and weaknesses, the event study methodology is widely accepted.
The Choices of Research Design
The research design of an event study impacts the results. Examples of research design
choices are the length of the estimation window, the length of the event window, the
choice of normal performance model and the input to the normal performance model.
The estimated parameters in the normal performance models may differ with the length
of the estimation window. In this thesis we use 200-days to minimize the variance of
the daily return. One could also use a shorter estimation window to better reflect the
most recent stock movements. The drivers behind the β are the capital structure of the
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company and how cyclical the industry is. These factors may change; thus the estimation
window should not be too long so that the movements in the estimation window reflects
the stock movement in the event window.
The Market Model is sensitive to the choice of market portfolio. In this thesis we use the
MSCI World Stock Index because the data sample consists of companies from all over the
world. The results would differ with another market portfolio.
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10 Conclusion
The objective of this thesis was to increase the knowledge about the stock market reaction
at the announcement of hacks for companies that store personal data. The intention was
to raise awareness of the trade-off between investing in cyber security and carrying the cost
of being hacked. The 42 greatest hacks in the world between 2007 and 2020 are studied
by using the event study methodology. We find a statistically significant CAR of negative
1.7% on the event date for the companies in the event pool. Moreover, the effect is not
transitory which indicates a long-term effect on the stock price. As a benchmark for cyber
security investments, we calculate the value of the negative CAR and find that eleven
companies in the event pool have an estimated cost of above one billion dollars related
to the announcement of hacks. The conclusion of our first hypothesis is consistent with
most previous research. When excluding the four most extreme observations, the overall
conclusion is unchanged. Hence, our findings provide IT managers and top executives an
incentive to invest in preventive measures to protect personal data, as shareholder value
is probably at risk.
Furthermore, we explore the role of consumers and regulatory agencies in inflicting financial
consequences on the companies that are hacked. First, we hypothesise that when there
are many victims in a hack, and the data extracted is of sensitive character, the stock
market reaction is relatively stronger. We find weak support for this hypothesis. The
number of records lost in the hack seems to influence the strength of the stock market
reaction, which indicates that there is some incentive alignment between top executives
and customers. The sensitivity of the data on the other hand does not.
Second, we hypothesise that data protection laws that enables authorities to impose fines
and sanctions on companies that are hacked, influence the market reaction by increasing
the expected tangible and intangible costs to the company. We find that on the event day
the average stock market reaction is stronger after the GDPR was implemented, however
the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant and the companies
that were announced hacked after the GDPR was put into effect recovered relatively
faster. However, the observed determinant may be time. In the cross-sectional regression
analysis, we find that the negative stock market reaction increased over time in our data
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sample. The results are consistent with previous research.
Every day we upload more personal data online, and every day more successful hacks are
carried out. Consequently, our personal data is continuously at risk of being exposed and
abused. In this thesis we find that top executives should be concerned with preventing
hacks because shareholder value is probably at risk. We also find that the negative stock
market reaction is possibly stronger when the number of records lost is high. Maybe this
effect originates from the expectation that consumers use their market power to punish
companies that have been hacked. Consequently, consumers should vote with their wallets
and personal data for the companies that protect their data from cyber-attacks. We do
not find support for the hypothesis that the GDPR gives a stronger stock market reaction
at the announcement of a hack. However, regulation internalizes the cost of hacks for the
companies, thus, we believe regulation contributes to solving the issue of cyber-attacks.
With this thesis we want to raise awareness of the financial consequences of being hacked
for companies that store personal data. We believe that companies play an important role
in ensuring that cyber-attacks are no longer one of the mayor risks to economic growth.
Suggestions for Further Research
For further research to increase the awareness of the financial consequences of cyber
security events, we suggest exploring the impact of the GDPR with a larger data sample,
as more hacks are disclosed over time. Moreover, the focus of this thesis is personal
data, but it would be interesting to analyse the market reaction when data related to
the performance of a company is extracted, such as blueprints or crucial information
for the company’s operations. In addition, we were not able to access data about cyber
security events in Norway. However, it would be interesting to investigate the stock market
reaction of cyber security events on companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange.
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Appendix
A1 Asset Pricing Theory
Asset pricing theory is helpful to understand how the expectation of increased costs and
decreased revenue affect the stock price of a company. According to Berk and DeMarzo
(2014) investors compute the value of a company by using models such as the Dividend
Discount Model and the Discounted Free Cash Flow Model. Hence, these two models are
elaborated below.
Dividend-Discount Model
An expanded dividend-discount model with constant long-term growth is used to calculate
the present value of dividends to find the value of the company’s stock (Berk & DeMarzo,
2014). In the model, dividends are the cash flows paid to the shareholders. The fair value
of the investment is the present value of all future dividends and the selling price of the
stock. According to Berk and DeMarzo (2014) when the investors have the same beliefs,













In the equation, DIV1 represents the dividend paid at time 1. The required rate of return
on equity is expressed as rE and P0 is the stock price at the time of the investment. T
represents the final time period in which the stock is sold. When there are expected
decreases in future dividends, the value of the stock decreases.
Discounted Free Cash Flow Model
The Discounted Free Cash Flow Model is used to estimate a company’s enterprise value
by discounting its future free cash flows (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). This method allows the
user to value companies which do not regularly pay out dividends. Generally, the cash
flows for a time period is forecasted, and then the terminal value for the free cash flow
beyond the time period is calculated. The present value is the company’s enterprise value.
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In the equation, V0 is the discounted free cash flow, while FCF1 is the free cash flow at
time 1. Furthermore, rWACC is the weighted average cost of capital, and the terminal
value of the free cash flow past time period T is expressed by VT . The constant growth
rate the free cash flows grow at beyond time T is equal to gFCF . When costs are expected
to increase and revenue is expected to decrease, the free cash flow is affected and the price
of the stock decreases.
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A2 Full Datasample
The table below provides an overview of the data sample that is analysed in this thesis.
It also shows which groups the events belong to. The events are sorted by CAR.
Table A2.1: Information about all the Events in the Sample
Dummies
Name Date of the hack CAR[0, 2] Records Lost Records Lost Data Sensitivity GDPR
Equifax 08.09.2017 -0.205 143 000 000 High High X
Zoom 02.04.2020 -0.108 500 000 Low Low After
Heartland 21.01.2009 -0.09 130 000 000 High High X
Facebook 19.03.2018 -0.071 50 000 000 High Low Before
Cathay Pacific Airways 25.10.2018 -0.062 94 000 000 High High After
Marriott International 30.11.2018 -0.055 383 000 000 High High After
Facebook 28.09.2018 -0.051 29 000 000 High High After
Sony PSN 21.04.2011 -0.043 77 000 000 High Low Before
Experian 02.10.2015 -0.039 15 000 000 High High Before
TalkTalk 23.10.2015 -0.037 157 000 Low High Before
Dell 29.11.2018 -0.034 100 000 Low Low After
Target 19.12.2013 -0.033 70 000 000 High High X
Apple 19.07.2013 -0.029 275 000 Low Low Before
Anthem 05.02.2015 -0.025 80 000 000 High High Before
KT Corp. 30.07.2012 -0.02 8 700 000 High High X
UPS 22.08.2014 -0.014 4 000 000 Low High Before
Honda Canada 27.05.2011 -0.012 283 000 Low High X
UbiSoft 03.07.2013 -0.012 58 000 000 High High Before
Ebay 21.05.2014 -0.011 145 000 000 High Low Before
Interpark 26.07.2016 -0.01 10 000 000 High High X
T-Mobile 24.08.2018 -0.01 2 000 000 Low Low After
Dixons Carphone 13.06.2018 -0.009 10 000 000 High Low After
Tesco Clubcard 04.05.2020 -0.009 600 000 Low Low After
Global Payments 04.04.2012 -0.008 7 000 000 High High Before
VTech 27.11.2015 -0.008 6 400 000 Low High Before
Adobe 03.10.2013 -0.007 36 000 000 High High Before
HSBC Turkey 12.11.2014 -0.006 2 700 000 Low High Before
Quest Diagnostics 12.12.2016 -0.006 34 000 Low High Before
Wendy’s 07.07.2016 -0.005 1 025 Low High X
AT&T 09.06.2010 -0.004 114 000 Low Low Before
Gmail (Oracle) 10.09.2014 -0.004 5 000 000 Low Low Before
Sony Online Entertainment 27.05.2011 -0.003 24 600 000 High High Before
Nintendo 08.07.2013 0.001 240 000 Low High Before
Toyota 29.05.2019 0.002 3 100 000 Low High After
Home Depot 03.09.2014 0.003 56 000 000 High High X
Microsoft 15.04.2019 0.003 44 000 000 High High After
Sega 20.06.2011 0.007 1 290 755 Low High Before
JP Morgan Chase 02.10.2014 0.014 76 000 000 High High Before
Dominios Pizzas (France) 16.06.2014 0.032 600 000 Low Low Before
TD Ameritrade 14.08.2007 0.038 6 300 000 Low Low X
Nintendo 09.06.2020 0.066 300 000 Low High After
Citigroup 09.06.2011 0.074 360 083 Low High Before
The events are sorted from smallest to highest CAR for the time interval from the event day till two days after the event.
The table shows how the different events in the sample were sorted when the analysis was conducted.
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A3 Figures without Zoom
Data Sensitivity in Analysis without Zoom
From the figures below, one can observe the effect of data sensitivity and the GDPR when
Zoom is excluded from the sample. This is because Zoom increases the difference between
the groups, due to high volatility during the event window. Zoom was originally in the
group with hacks of low sensitivity and in the group after the GDPR was implemented.
When excluding this outlier, one can see that the groups that included Zoom have shifted
down and the difference between the two groups is smaller. The conclusions in the analysis
above do not change.
Figure A3.1: Data Sensitivity without Zoom
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GDPR in Analysis without Zoom
Figure A3.2: GDPR without Zoom
